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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental changes necessary to prevent wholesale destruc-
tion of the nation's (and the world's) natural resources will occur only
if people have powerful incentives to rethink and reform their behavior
toward the environment.' But because Congress either was supremely
* Adam Babich practices environmental law with the Denver, Colorado firm of
Cornwell & Blakey. He is a graduate of Yale Law School. This Article is based in part on
Babich, Restructuring Environmental Law, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10057
(1989). Copyright: Adam Babich (1989).
1. According to former United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ad-
ministrator William D. Ruckelshaus, an adequate response to environmental problems
will require "a modification of society comparable in scale to only two other changes: the
agricultural revolution of the late Neolithic period and the Industrial Revolution of the
past two centuries." Ruckelshaus, Toward a Sustainable World, 261 ScL Am. 166, 167
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confident in its ability to transform the nation by fiat or simply under-
estimated the problem at hand, the major federal antipollution stat-
utes of the 1970s rest on the assumption that, if outlawed, harmful
pollution will stop.2 Of course, the threat of government enforcement
provides one incentive for change, but the nation's exercise of its police
power is neither certain nor efficient enough, and environmental regu-
lations are not comprehensive enough, to force the expeditious, basic
changes in attitude and behavior that are needed.3 To be successful,
environmental laws must move beyond command-and-control regula-
tion and become largely self-enforcing.
In the 1980s, Congress-jolted into action by several highly publi-
cized environmental disasters-began a fundamental restructuring of
environmental law, creating persuasive new incentives for private ac-
tion to prevent pollution.4 For years, legal scholars had argued that
(1989). Mr. Ruckelshaus further notes that, because the required societal changes must
be "a fully conscious operation, guided by the best foresight that science can provide,"
the undertaking would be "absolutely unique in humanity's stay on earth." Id.
2. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989), set the
general pattern for the other major environmental statutes of the 1970s including: the
Clean Water Act (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1251-1376 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. 6901-6991i (West
1983 & Supp. 1989); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f - 300j-11
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2629 (1988); and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
An exception to the general pattern for 1970s environmental laws is the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
which, rather than imposing substantive environmental quality standards, requires de-
velopment of information to ensure that government agencies make decisions only after
considering significant potential environmental impacts. Congress adopted an analogous
information based approach to environmental protection in the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA or SARA Title III), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(Supp. V 1987). EPCRA requires owners and operators of industrial facilities to report to
public agencies about the kinds and quantities of dangerous chemicals they store, dis-
pose of, and release from their facilities. The statute requires government agencies to use
this information to develop plans for averting and responding to chemical emergencies.
3. Violators often receive economic benefits from their violations that exceed the
fines that the EPA imposes, even assuming that the EPA discovers the violations. See,
e.g., "Forceless Enforcement" Found by OMB at EPA; Inspector General Cites Millions
in Reduced Fines, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1087, 1088 (Oct. 20, 1989). Arguably, the govern-
ment might improve its enforcement record by increasing the use of the criminal provi-
sions of environmental statutes to deter violators. See Starr, Too Many Cooks .... , 6
ENVTL. F. 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1989). There are so many businesses subject to environmental
regulation, however, that it is difficult to imagine an enforcement staff large enough to
police the entire regulated community effectively.
4. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985) (Con-
gress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
[Vol. 41
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traditional, command-and-control regulatory mechanisms were inade-
quate to control pollution and urged an overhaul of environmental leg-
islation.5 Rather than adopting the largely market-based schemes of
these theorists, however, Congress turned for inspiration to a system
that for centuries has used the threat of civil liability as a means of
social control: the common law tort system.'
The resulting statutes-including the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA),7 the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
(HSWA),s which amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA),9 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA),10 which amended CERCLA and created the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA or
SARA Title III)"-herald a shift in the primary focus of environmen-
tal law from prospective regulation to retroactive liability.12 The effect
of these new, liability-based statutes is to assign much of the responsi-
bility for planning for a dangerous and uncertain environmental future
to that segment of society most capable of finding innovative and effi-
cient solutions: the private sector. Congress's environmental initiatives
of the 1980s disrupt the normal routines of businesses and consumers.
Act after concluding that existing prospective laws were inadequate to address environ-
mental disasters such as Love Canal.).
5. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv.
1333 (1985); Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alter-
natives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 547 (1979); Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits:
Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989).
6. Congress's focus on the common law tort system in enacting the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989), is clear from Congress's decision to allow signifi-
cant issues to be determined by the courts as a matter of federal common law, see, e.g.,
United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989);
Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983), and from Congress's requirement for
studies of the adequacy of common law remedies for injuries to the public not addressed
in CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(3) (1982).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). Unless otherwise specified, "CER-
CLA," as used in this Article, refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, and codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675.
8. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
10. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. V 1987)
12. The courts uniformly have upheld the constitutionality of retroactive liability in
this context. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733-734 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
1990]
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Businesses now must analyze potential environmental liabilities not
only for their waste disposal operations, but also for a vast array of
other activities. Consumers ultimately may find familiar conveniences
of the chemical era becoming unavailable or prohibitively expensive.
13
Nonetheless, a broad, liability-based approach to protecting the envi-
ronment has the potential to bring about a quantum leap in the effec-
tiveness of environmental laws. Whether short-term disruptions will
cause Congress to retreat from this new approach before the long-term
benefits are realized remains an open question.14
II. THE LImITs OF PROSPECTIVE REGULATION
Most federal environmental laws, originally enacted during the
1970s, rely on a system known as command-and-control regulation.1
5
Under these laws, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and other government agencies try to control pollution by issu-
ing detailed regulations and permits that prescribe the manner in
which the regulated community may generate, transport, store, dispose
of, and release chemicals that the government believes are dangerous.
Command-and-control regulation presupposes the government's
ability to: (1) identify environmental problems and set rational priori-
ties; (2) develop regulations that provide technologically workable and
politically viable solutions; and (3) enforce those regulations effec-
tively. Unfortunately, in the area of environmental protection none of
these presuppositions has proven true.'0 The enormous scope and com-
plexity of environmental problems and resulting scientific and political
uncertainties explain much of this failure. Other problems result from
13. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (regarding the effect of liability-based
statutes on business transactions); see also Davidoff, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities, 11
AMIcus J. 12, 23 (Winter, 1989) (consumers have become accustomed to the convenience
of living with many of the chemicals that threaten public health and the environment).
14. See Domenici Declares Superfund "Failure," Suggests Revamped Liability
Scheme, 10 Inside E.P.A. 4 (Sept. 22, 1989) Senator Pete Domenici has suggested that it
might be time to consider a public-works rather than liability-based approach to clean-
ing up toxic waste sites. Id.
15. See, e.g., Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18 ENVTL.
L. 505 (1988); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981); Hahn, Book Review, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 173
(1986) (review R. LROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION THE TOIL AND TROUBLE
OF THE EPA's BUBBLE).
16. See Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives,
13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 156-158 (1988); Commoner, Failure of the Environmental
Effort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10195 (1988); Muskie, Reflections on a Quarter
Century of Environmental Activism: On Postponing Deadlines, Second-Guessing the
Congress, and Ignoring Problems Until It is Too Late, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10081 (Mar. 1988).
[Vol. 41
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deficiencies in various antipollution statutes and regulations. A more
fundamental cause is rooted in the seemingly inherent inability of large
government bureaucracies to accomplish their missions efficiently.
A. Institutional Constraints
The EPA bureaucracy's attempts to use command-and-control
regulation to impose nationwide pollution control have been compared
to the debacle of central economic planning in the Soviet Union. 7 No
incentives are built into the regulatory process for the EPA to operate
efficiently or creatively. Attempts to solve this problem through "regu-
latory reform" so far have only added paperwork (e.g., Regulatory Im-
pact and Regulatory Flexibility Analyses) and still another layer of bu-
reaucracy (i.e., the Office of Management and Budget) to an already
bloated process.' Although bureaucratic inefficiencies provide no ex-
cuse for wholesale deregulation,'9 they do point to the need to augment
the regulatory system to encourage private antipollution initiatives.
When faced with complex environmental issues, the EPA is much
more capable of responding to immediate political pressures than of
anticipating long-term environmental problems, setting priorities, or
developing solutions. For example, despite Congressional enactment of
RCRA-an ambitious law governing hazardous waste management-in
1976, the EPA did not even begin significant regulation of hazardous
17. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 5, at 1334.
18. Under Executive Order 12,291, the EPA must judge whether each regulation will
cause sufficient economic impacts to qualify as a "major rule." The Agency generally
must conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis of major rules. Executive Order 12,291 also
requires the EPA to submit proposed rules to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review. Regulatory Flexibility Analyses are required by 5 U.S.C. § 603 (1988).
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), EPA
information collection requirements must be approved by 0MB. See generally Dole v.
United Steelworkers of America, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990).
OMB has imposed controversial delays on EPA promulgation of significant regula-
tions. See House Panel Democrats Release OMB/EPA Papers Showing Interference in
Superfund Regulations, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2459 (Mar. 17, 1989); House Subcommit-
tee Denies OMB Funds for Rule Review Unit Pending Authorization, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 604 (July 28, 1989); OMB Rejects Proposed Incinerator Regs, Citing High Cost,
Low Return, 10 Inside E.P.A. 1 (March 10, 1989).
19. Damage to the nation's environment would have been worse if not for EPA regu-
lation under the command-and-control environmental laws of the 1970s. Former EPA
administrator Russell E. Train has stated that "[n]o nation in the world has grappled so
successfully with those issues as the United States.. . . Without these accomplishments
where would we be today? We would be like Mexico City or Sgo Paulo." Shabecoff,
Minor Gains in Ecology and Major Challenges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, at B10, col.
1990]
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waste until four years later, when required to do so by court order.2 0
Congress's frustration with the EPA's consistent failure to implement
environmental laws by statutory deadlines is reflected in the "ham-
mer" provisions of HSWA, the 1984 amendments to RCRA.21
Congress itself, however, is no better than the EPA at responding
to complex, and sometimes poorly understood, threats to the environ-
ment. This fact is highlighted by Congress's difficulties throughout the
1980s in reauthorizing the Clean Air Act.22 Even when the EPA and
Congress do act, powerful economic interests such as the oil and min-
ing industries often persuade both institutions to grant broad exemp-
tions from environmental laws, thus allowing vast quantities of danger-
ous materials to go unregulated. 23 Similarly, the United States Justice
Department has convinced the EPA not to bring other federal agencies
to court over pollution problems. 4 As a result, the federal government
20. See Illinois v. Costle, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20243 (D.D.C. Jan. 3,
1979); see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (court of appeals discussed district court's jurisdiction to review further actions of
EPA after district court had ordered EPA to promulgate RCRA regulations). See gener-
ally infra note 132 (EPA's priorities may be more closely aligned with public opinion
than with estimated risks).
21. As amended by HSWA, RCRA not only provides deadlines for EPA action, but
also sets forth, in the so-called "hammer provisions," specific consequences for the EPA's
failure to meet those deadlines. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(8) (Supp. V 1987) (unless
EPA promulgates standards for small quantity generators by the statutory deadline, con-
gressionally selected standards shall apply); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(6)(c) (Supp. V 1987)
(land disposal of certain hazardous wastes shall be banned if EPA fails to promulgate
regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(5)). See generally Florio, Congress as Reluctant
Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (1986) (Con-
gress has taken on role of regulator due to EPA's refusal to carry out congressional in-
tent); Mugdan & Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a Regulatory
Agency, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215 (1985) (amendments to RCRA indicate congressional
distrust of EPA's implementation of regulations). Congress's frustration with EPA inac-
tion is documented in Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 826, n.34 (1988).
22. See Kilgore, Muddling Through: Congressional Activity in 1988, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10016 (Jan. 1989); Ruckelshaus, supra note 1, at 169-70.
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A) (1982) (exempting, inter alia, waste from
most mining and milling activities from RCRA regulation pending an EPA determina-
tion to be made after the completion of studies); 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (1982) (authorizing
EPA to grant extra time for certain nonferrous smelters to comply with Clean Air Act
regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (excluding "petroleum, includ-
ing crude oil or any fraction thereof" from CERCLA's definition of "hazardous sub-
stance" unless specifically listed or designated); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i) (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (exempting from CERCLA's liability provisions contamination caused by applica-
tion of a registered pesticide product); 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(5), (7) (exempting most min-
ing wastes and wastes associated with exploration, development or production of crude
oil from RCRA Subtitle C's definition of hazardous waste).
24. See EPA, FEDERAL FAcmrirms COMPLIANCE STRATEGY VI-3 (Nov. 1988) (Pursuant
[Vol. 41
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is one of the nation's most persistent violators of environmental laws. 5
B. Assessing the Risks
Issues of EPA and Congressional competence aside, full regulation
of the staggering number of dangerous chemicals in use and develop-
ment is not a realistic possibility. Assessing the danger that even a sin-
gle chemical poses to public health and the environment is a formida-
ble task, clouded by scientific uncertainty.28 Because scientists cannot
ethically experiment on people to determine a chemical's toxicity, car-
cinogenicity, mutagenicity and teratogenicity, regulators must rely on
relatively soft data in deciding which chemicals to regulate and how
stringently to regulate them.
To determine the need for regulation, the government generally
proceeds chemical by chemical, employing a risk assessment approach
that is slow and resource intensive. Because industry constantly adds
new chemicals to the thousands already on the market,27 this chemical-
by-chemical approach provides little assurance that the government
has analyzed all or even most significant hazards.28
to the position of the U.S. Justice Department, the "EPA will not bring civil judicial
suits against Executive Branch Agencies." (emphasis omitted)).
25. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION:
STRONGER ENFORCEMENT IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE AT FEDERAL FACILITIES 3
(1988) (GAO/RCED-89-13) ("Federal facilities' rate of noncompliance with [Clean Water
Act] priority program requirements is twice that of nonfederal industrial facilities.");
Wald, Waste Dumping that U.S. Banned Went on at Its Own Atom Plants, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (Extensive environmental damage at Federal nuclear weapon
plants is largely a result of crude waste disposal practices that were banned in the pri-
vate sector a decade ago.). Indeed, the United States Army's Rocky Mountain Arsenal
reportedly is "the worst hazardous and toxic waste site in America." Colorado v. United
States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo. 1989).
26. See, e.g., Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 91 (1988). See generally Risk Assessment in Environmental Law, 14
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 289 (1989) (various symposium articles concerning risk assessment).
27. See Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
307, 308 (1989) (scientists have provided reasonably complete evidence on human toxic-
ity on only about 1000 of the approximately 60,000 chemicals in common use).
28. One commentator stated:
"[W]e may well find ourselves in the midst of a chemical holocaust brought
upon ourselves by bureaucratic incrementalism and corporate tunnel vision.
... After all, we are being asked to trust the same people who gave us DDT,
Keypone, dioxin, PCBs, EDB in our foods, asbestos in our schools and houses
and public buildings, DES to prevent miscarriages, UFFI, unvented gas heat-
ers, tris flame retardant in children's sleepwear, hormones and antibiotics in
our meat, pesticide residues in our food, and formaldehyde in our permanent
press fabrics and paper towels. The list goes on and on. Those same folks who
are supposed to be guarding the barn keep shutting the door after each horse
1990]
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Generally, to assess the risks that a chemical poses to the public,
government agencies must answer three questions:
* What types of risks does the chemical pose?
" At what dose is the chemical dangerous?
* How many people are exposed, or at risk of exposure, to how
much of the chemical?
2 9
Answering the first two questions, that is, performing the hazard
identification and dose-response evaluation steps in a risk assessment,
requires the agency to evaluate data from experiments on animals, epi-
demiological studies (generally of occupational exposures), if any, and
theoretical analyses.3 0 Essentially all of the techniques used to draw
conclusions from these data, however, are controversial. For example,
the fact that a chemical does or does not cause cancer in laboratory
animals does not conclusively establish what dangers the chemical may
pose to people. And it is not self-evident that chemicals that harm
workers exposed to relatively large doses over long time periods will
have similar effects on the population at large when those chemicals
enter, and are diluted by, the environment.31
has been stolen."
Davidoff, supra note 13, at 23 (quoting Earon Davis).
Recently, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to authorize use of creative alter-
natives to a chemical-by-chemical approach. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (EPA "shall develop and publish information on methods for establishing and
measuring water quality criteria for toxic pollutants on other bases than pollutant-by-
pollutant criteria, including biological monitoring and assessment methods."). Similarly,
Congress's direction to the EPA to develop regulations under RCRA identifying mea-
sures or indicators of toxicity will reduce reliance on chemical-by-chemical analyses. See
42 U.S.C. § 6921(h) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
29. See 52 Fed. Reg. 12,870 (1987) (setting forth guidelines of the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) for developing toxicological profiles under 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i)); see also Daggett, Hazen & Shaw, Advancing Environmental Protec-
tion Through Risk Assessment, 14 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 315, 317 (1989); Gordis, Epidemi-
ologic Approaches for Studying Human Diseases in Relation to Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal Sites, 25 Hous. L. REv. 837 (1988).
30. See F. Cnoss, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW, 52-60 (1989);
Lave, supra note 27, at 312.
31. As one commentator reports:
Toxic risk assessment suffers from fundamental uncertainties about causal
mechanisms for cancer and other hazards, extrapolative relationships between
high-dose and low-dose responses and between animal test data and human
risks, latent effects and latency periods, special sensitivities in exposed sub-
populations, synergistic or co-carcinogenic effects of various substances, past
and present exposure levels, dispersion patterns for contaminants, and virtu-
ally every other area of required knowledge. These uncertainties generally
preclude reliable assessments of relevant effects, and there is no scientific
consensus on how they should be resolved.
Latin, supra note 26, at 91 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Office of Sci-
[Vol. 41
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To further complicate matters, dose-response relationships often
differ between population groups. Children, fetuses, the aged and
smokers are especially vulnerable to some chemicals. 32 Moreover, com-
binations of chemicals may have impacts greater than the sum of the
effects of individual chemicals. Such synergistic effects are poorly un-
derstood and difficult to predict.3"
Answering the third question accurately, that is, performing the
exposure assessment step of a risk assessment, requires intensive data-
gathering that is complicated and expensive.34 Regulators who attempt
to determine the quantities, types, and locations of chemicals present
in the environment must rely on data, if any, from the monitoring of
pollutants at the source or in the environment, estimates of chemical
releases made in lieu of monitoring, and controversial attempts to
model the dispersion of chemicals in air, water and soil.35 To assess the
extent to which people are exposed to these chemicals, regulators must
have data-or make assumptions-about the behavior of the exposed
population. For example, exposures will vary with the amount of con-
taminated soil ingested by children, or the extent to which people use
polluted ground water to irrigate their gardens.,
Not surprisingly, scientists draw conclusions from risk assessment
data that conflict wildly in their implications for environmental policy.
Some scientists argue that we face an epidemic of cancer and other
diseases caused by ubiquitous chemical contamination of our environ-
ment."1 Others assert that environmental hazards are greatly exagger-
ated and that the government overregulates industry in a misguided
ence and Technology Policy, Chemical Carcinogens: A Review of the Science and Its
Associated Principles, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,372 (1985) (adopting assumptions to resolve scien-
tific uncertainties). See generally, F. CROSS, supra note 30, at 62-65 (discussing limita-
tions of risk assessment). Indeed, even the definition of harm is controversial. See, e.g.,
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1156-61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980) (affirming EPA's decision to set lead standard to protect against change in blood
chemistry despite Lead Industries Association's claim that the change "is a mere 'sub-
clinical effect'-a biological response to lead exposure-which is without health
significance.").
32. Commoner, The Hazards of Risk Assessment, 14 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 365, 372
(1989); Latin, supra note 26, at 91.
33. S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 58 (1978); Latin, supra note 26, at 91.
34. See Stanfield, Problems with Data Collection Hinder Efforts on Pollution, Ex-
perts Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at C4, col..
35. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too Conservative?: Revising the Revisionists,
14 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 427, 443-44 (1989).
36. Lave, supra note 27, at 311. See generally Paustenbach, Health Risk Assess-
ments: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 379, 402-06 (1989) (detailing
the exposure assessment phase of risk analysis).
37. See, e.g., S. EPSTEIN, supra note 33.
1990]
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effort to create a risk-free society.3 8 Because scientists and others pre-
sent these arguments to a public that lacks the scientific expertise to
evaluate them, the debate is essentially political. Occasional chemical
disasters such as the Bhopal incident,39 and mounting evidence of the
global effects of pollution, including ozone depletion, acid rain and the
greenhouse effect,40 make it unlikely that the public soon will be con-
vinced that the government is being overprotective.
C. Imposing Standards
Once risks are assessed-however accurately or inaccu-
rately-regulators face the difficult job of deciding how much danger to
the public and environment to tolerate. Setting an "acceptable" level
of risk involves the scientifically, legally and politically complex task of
balancing, either implicitly or explicitly, public health and welfare con-
38. See M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982); E. EFRON, THE APo-
CALYPTICS (1984). See generally F. CROSS, supra note 30; Elliott, The Future of Toxic
Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Sys-
tems, 25 Hous. L. REv. 781, 785 nn.14-15 (1988).
39. In December 1984 methyl isocyanate released from a Union Carbide Corporation
pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, killed more than 2,800 people and injured more than
300,000. See All Claims from Bhopal Disaster Settled for $470 Million by India, Union
Carbide, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1157 (Feb. 22, 1989). One court called the Bhopal inci-
dent "the most tragic industrial disaster in history." In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). The tragedy gave rise to fears that a
similar disaster could occur in the United States, especially at Union Carbide's methyl
isocyanate plant in West Virginia. Chern, Union Carbide's Plant at Institute, W. Va.:
Lessons from Bhopal, 11 EPA J. No. 6 21 (July-Aug. 1985).
More recent incidents keep hazardous waste issues before the public. See, e.g.,
Chemical Disaster Spurs Doubts over EPA Chemical Awareness Program Success, 9
Inside E.P.A. 11 (May 1988) (discussing chemical explosion at Nevada manufacturing
facility); Schmitt, Leak Ends a Town's Idyllic Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1988, at A13,
col. 6 (city ed.) (describing effects on public welfare and property values of an under-
ground leak of one million gallons of leaded gasoline in Long Island, New York); Hanley,
Buried Chromium Poses a Threat to New Jersey, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1989, at A12, col.
1 (nat.l ed.) (one person dead and tens of thousands face health risks from hexavalent
chromium leaking from dump sites). Recent reports have publicized risks posed by stor-
age of hazardous substances near population centers. For example, one such report
states:
[T]he water treatment plant for the District of Columbia keeps chlorine in
tank cars stored on its premises. If one of those cars ruptured, it could send a
plume of dense, highly poisonous chlorine gas 40 miles across the city and sur-
rounding countryside. In all likelihood, the gas would pass directly over the
Capitol and the White House.
Shabecoff, The Early Returns of a Toxic Poll, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at F10, col. 3.
40. See Graedel & Crutzen, The Changing Atmosphere, 261 ScL Am 58 (1989);
Schneider, The Changing Climate, 261 ScL AM. 70 (1989).
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siderations against the economic costs of risk reduction. This balance
necessarily depends on the value of the human life or environmental
resource to be protected: a value that can be expressed, albeit contro-
versially, in terms of dollars."1
Regulators can estimate (with questionable accuracy) the amount
of money each regulation will require society to devote to risk reduc-
tion and the number of injuries, including deaths, that each regulation
will avoid. As regulators attempt to save more and more lives, the cost
of regulation per life saved generally increases. Presumably, at some
point, the marginal cost of saving additional lives is too high to justify
further regulation.4
2
Exactly how much money is too much to spend to save a life is a
question that government officials avoid answering directly. Instead,
the EPA tends to express risk management decisions in terms of a
range of "acceptable risks," that the Agency purports to justify without
reference to the cost of further risk reduction.'8 Alternatively, the EPA
imposes regulatory limits based on the capabilities of reasonably avail-
able technology. The government usually does not justify these limita-
tions (e.g., Best Available Control Technology (BACT) and Lowest
Achievable Emissions Rate (LAER)) in terms of risk."
Arguably, the question of how many of society's dollars to spend
41. See C. GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, FEDFRAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF HUMAN LIFE; A
REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (July 7, 1988) at 1; F.
CROSS, supra note 30, at 70-73.
42. C. GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, supra note 41, at 2 (Office of Management and
Budget has documented "implicit" agency decisions that economic value of life is as low
as $70,000 and as high as $312 million).
43. In setting a standard for benzene under the National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants program, the EPA responded to the D.C. Circuit's holding that
the Clean Air Act requires the Agency to determine an acceptable level of risk before
considering cost. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Rather than deciding that, if cost is not considered, only trivial risks are
acceptable, the EPA compiled a "Survey of Societal Risk" and purported to base its
decision on accepted risks "in the world in which we live." 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,046-47
(1989). The risk survey, set forth at 53 Fed. Reg. 28,496, 28,512-13 (1988), includes risks
posed by car accidents, city air inhalation, home accidents, radon in homes, and pesti-
cides. Because people presumably would reduce such risks if cost were not a factor, the
EPA's use of its Survey of Societal Risk as the basis for a risk-acceptability decision
allows cost to influence decisions through the back door.
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (1982) (major air pollution sources in areas that
have attained ambient air quality standards must use "the best available control tech-
nology" (BACT) to prevent significant deterioration of air quality); 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2)
(Supp. V 1987) (major air pollution sources in areas that have not attained ambient
standards must meet "the lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER)). For a general (and
critical) description of technology-based standards, see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note
5, at 1335-38; see also B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DmRTY Am 94 & n.39
(1981).
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protecting the environment is so fundamental that our democratically
elected officials, rather than bureaucrats or courts, should answer it."5
Congress, however, clearly is unwilling to face the issue squarely.
Neither sacrificing environmental quality and public health for eco-
nomic reasons nor bankrupting the economy to create a risk-free envi-
ronment is acceptable politics.
Congress enacts environmental statutes that, on their face, call for
virtual elimination of harmful pollution, but allows the EPA to pro-
mulgate regulations replete with explicit and implicit economic trade-
offs.' 6 For example:
* The Clean Water Act's stated goal is to eliminate discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States by 1985.' 7 Yet the
EPA ignores the Act's goal of pollution elimination in favor of a
regulatory approach designed to protect designated uses of sur-
face waters and to minimize further degradation. 8
* The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to adopt National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) that not only
protect public health but also provide, respectively, "adequate"
and "ample" margins of safety.49 By defining the term "ambient
air" to include only air to which the public has access, however,
the EPA limits the applicability of NAAQS and thus avoids im-
posing stricter standards on polluters.50 To obviate the need to
45. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 44, at 122-26;
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT. L. 171, 188-90 (1988).
46. Dean Guido Calabresi explains such seemingly hypocritical government behavior
as a response to an irreconcilable conflict between society's need to view each human life
as priceless and the scarcity of resources available for actually treating each life as price-
less. Thus, society tends to affirm the pricelessness of life in visible, symbolic ways (e.g.,
spending a million dollars rescuing a single downed balloonist) while declining to spend
money on projects that would prevent future deaths (e.g., providing shore patrols). G.
CALA13RESI & P. BOBBiT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(1982) ("[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pol-
lutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(1982) (defining "navigable waters" to mean "the waters of the United States").
48. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (1989) (governing adoption of water quality criteria to
protect designated uses); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1989) (setting forth EPA's antidegradation
policy).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982) (Primary National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982) (National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants).
50. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1989) (defining "[a]mbient air" as "that portion of the
atmosphere . . . to which the general public has access"). By defining ambient air in
terms of access, the EPA allows companies to avoid violating ambient standards by
purchasing and fencing off the property where standards are exceeded. This technique of
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require strict controls on most hazardous air pollutants, the
Agency declines to regulate more than a handful of the myriad
potentially carcinogenic and toxic air pollutants.5
* Congress intended RCRA to assure that hazardous waste is man-
aged in a manner "so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment."52 The EPA, how-
ever, avoids extensive regulation of various dangerous waste man-
agement practices by defining "hazardous waste" to exclude
them.1
3
• CERCLA requires a level of cleanup of hazardous substances
that, at a minimum, "assures protection of human health and
the environment." 5 ' Nonetheless, the EPA interprets CERCLA
to allow a wide "acceptable risk" range.
55
Thus, Congress publicly-and largely symbolically-mandates
that the environment be free of dangerous pollutants. But the EPA,
rather than taking Congress at its word and imposing regulations that
achieving standards by limiting access enables businesses to avoid or minimize the need
to reduce emissions. This result might make sense if Congress had intended only to re-
quire compliance with ambient standards. Congress, however, also intended ambient
standards to lead to emission reductions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1982) (prohibiting busi-
nesses from avoiding the need to reduce emissions by building excessively tall smoke-
stacks or adopting other techniques that use atmospheric conditions to disperse
pollutants).
51. Graham, The Failure of Agency Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcino-
gens under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DuKE L.J. 100 (1985).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
53. RCRA Subtitle C regulations list hazardous wastes, see 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33
(1989), and also set forth characteristics that identify hazardous wastes even if they are
not listed, see 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-.24 (1989). EPA regulations set forth only four charac-
teristics for identifying hazardous wastes: (1) ignitibility; (2) corrosivity; (3) reactivity;
and (4) toxicity. Id. In 1984, Congress ordered the EPA to identify "additional character-
istics of hazardous waste, including measures or indicators of toxicity" by November
1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(h) (1982). Perhaps because there is no "hammer provision"
associated with section 6921(h), see supra note 21, the EPA did not revise its regulations
governing the toxicity characteristic until 1990. See 55 Fed.Reg. 11,798 (1990).
Similarly, prior to enactment of HSWA, the EPA created out of whole cloth an ex-
emption from RCRA requirements for "small quantity generators" (i.e., businesses that
generate less than 1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste in a month). See 45 Fed. Reg.
33,084, 33,102-05 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 76,620 (1980). Congress, with enactment of
HSWA, adopted the concept of applying special rules to small-quantity generators, but
sharply limited the EPA's approach. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (Supp. V 1987). Additionally,
the EPA will not regulate various wastes from mining operations under RCRA Subtitle
C, despite the fact that the EPA "recognizes, as evidenced by the mining waste sites on
the National Priorities List, the potential for problems from mining sites." 51 Fed. Reg.
24,496, 24,499 (1986).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
55. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8716-18 (1990) (discussing EPA's decision to set a range
of acceptable risks for carcinogens in regulations promulgated under CERCLA).
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would either force an economic restructuring or cause Congress to re-
vise the laws,56 makes ad hoc, painfully slow decisions as to how far to
push congressional goals. Although Congress routinely lambastes the
EPA for failing to implement the law as written, it rarely interferes
with the Agency's actual decisions. Consequently, the system works
well as a matter of politics, but does little to inspire confidence in com-
mand-and-control regulation as the sole means of protecting our
environment.
D. Implementation and Enforcement
Once finally made, the EPA's regulatory decisions generally are
questionable enough to allow special interests to tie up implementation
and enforcement in months, if not years, of litigation. Similarly, in
recent years, the Office of Management and Budget has imposed long
delays on the EPA's issuance of regulations while the Office pressures
the Agency to reduce the economic impact of the regulations and ac-
cept greater environmental risks."
Even after regulations are final, some environmental laws are ex-
tremely cumbersome to enforce. For example, to enforce many Clean
Air Act requirements, the EPA must notify the violator of its violation
and may file suit only if the violation persists over thirty days after the
notice.59 The regulatory structure of RCRA has become so byzantine
that the prospect of explaining many of its provisions to a court can be
quite daunting.60 Overall, the' EPA neither conducts nor requires suffi-
cient monitoring of emissions or environmental quality to support a
vigorous enforcement effort.61 And as amply demonstrated during the
early years of the Reagan administration, EPA enforcement often is
complicated by the vagaries of politics. 62
56. Cf. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (the snail darter/Tellico
dam case). In Hill, the Supreme Court declined to second-guess congressional policy de-
cisions despite the fact that those decisions would lead to unintended economic impacts.
See id. at 154. As Justice Powell noted in his dissent, if Congress is unhappy with the
literal application of its statute, Congress may revise that statute. Id. at 195-96 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
57. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 45, at 182; Stewart, supra note 16, at 157.
58. See supra note 18.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1982).
60. For example, the definition of "hazardous waste" under RCRA covers more than
ten pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3-.33 (1989).
61. See Stanfield, supra note 34; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d
645, 657-65 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. See generally Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Re-
view of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683
(1988).
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The greatest weakness of command-and-control environmental
statutes is that they are not self-enforcing. In other words, the laws fail
to provide incentives for members of the regulated community to po-
lice themselves and one another. Moreover, under the command-and-
control system, the regulated community's sole responsibility is to
comply with government edicts. If a statute or regulation does not for-
bid a particular practice, industry may engage in that practice with
impunity.63 Thus, the risk that environmental hazards have escaped
scientific scrutiny and regulatory control is borne by the public. Com-
mand-and-control regulation leaves the task of planning ahead to steer
society through complex environmental problems solely to a govern-
ment bureaucracy that simply is not up to the job.
III. THE MARKETABLE PERMIT MODEL
Several commentators argue that Congress should replace com-
mand-and-control regulation with a system that uses marketable per-
mits to create economic incentives to reduce pollution in a more effi-
cient manner." In general, the current command-and-control system is
designed to force each source of pollution to comply with specific emis-
sion limitations which, as a practical matter, require adoption of par-
ticular pollution control technologies.15 In contrast, a marketable per-
mit system would allow businesses to buy and sell rights to pollute
within government designated areas, enabling businesses to make the
same overall emission reductions less expensively. By regulating the
amount of pollution rights available in each designated area, the EPA
would protect the environment while eliminating some aspects of the
central planning required under the current system. 6
63. Of course, the possibility of tort actions may provide some deterrent. The tort
system, however, as it has evolved to date, does not provide a consistent, credible threat
that companies will have to pay for injuries that they cause. See F. CROSS, supra note 30,
at 183-217.
64. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Ackerman & Elliot, Air Pollu-
tion "Rights," N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at 23, col. 2.
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. Professors Ackerman and Stewart argue that a marketable permit system would
greatly reduce the EPA's information processing burden because the EPA would not
need to determine the Best Available Technology (BAT) for limiting emissions. Simi-
larly, Ackerman and Stewart suggest that their proposals would reduce the burden on
the courts by eliminating appeals of BAT decisions. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 45, at 180. However, although a marketable permit system would reduce the govern-
ment's involvement in assigning specific emission limitations to businesses, the EPA
would continue to assign limits to pollution control regions (i.e., determine the volume of
pollution rights on the market). This decision necessarily would involve a determination
of feasibility or risk-and the decision would be appealable. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V
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Although ingenious, marketable permit schemes have yet to gain
widespread acceptance. One reason is that the wholesale scrapping of
command-and-control regulation, and replacement with a new system,
would disrupt the status quo in favor of a theory that is largely unt-
ested.67 Furthermore, a marketable permit program would not solve
two of the most severe problems plaguing environmental protection
programs: lack of adequate monitoring and insufficient enforcement.68
Unless carefully regulated, a system that allowed industry to redis-
tribute pollution rights could result in excessive local impacts from in-
dividual facilities.6" And although Congress presumably could use a
marketable permit system to limit generation of hazardous materials,
7 0
it is unclear how marketable permits would enhance regulation of haz-
ardous waste disposal facilities, since the regulatory goal generally is to
prevent-rather than control-releases of pollutants.
The government continues to experiment with variations of the
marketable permit idea to supplement existing programs.7 In fact,
1987). Moreover, the EPA's chemical-by-chemical approach to risk identification and as-
sessment presumably would continue unchanged.
67. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 5, at 1333-34.
68. Professors Ackerman and Stewart argue that a marketable permit system would
motivate the EPA to enforce the law more effectively since poor enforcement would re-
duce the price of pollution rights, which, under the Ackerman/Stewart system would in
turn reduce the Agency's funding. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 45, at 183. Asser-
tions that economic incentives will improve a huge federal bureaucracy's behavior, how-
ever, are unproven at best.
69. Professors Ackerman and Stewart nonetheless suggest that pollution rights
could be traded freely for 5 to 10 years in existing air quality control regions and water-
shed boundaries. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 5, at 1350. Stewart, however, ac-
knowledges elsewhere that:
[marketable permit systems] control aggregate pollution or risk levels, but not
the levels produced by any one facility or at any one location. They are there-
fore best adapted to deal with environmental problems that are not local in
character.. .. Local effects can, however, often be dealt with by a combination
of regulation and economic incentives.
Stewart, supra note 16, at 167 (emphasis added).
In addition to the practical problem of local impacts, a marketable permit system
could lead to political problems. A system that allows emissions to vary depending on
the market for pollution rights may frustrate the desire of those who live or work near a
pollution source to know, specifically, the amount of pollutants the source will emit and
whether the source will employ state-of-the-art pollution control equipment.
70. Alternatively, generation of hazardous waste could be taxed. See Davis, supra
note 15, at 521-22; see also Russell, Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazard-
ous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257 (1988) (advocating a "deposit-refund" system to
control hazardous waste).
71. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 5, at 366-406 (describing experiments in market-
able permits including emissions trading (i.e., "offsets," "netting," "bubbles," and
"banking") and inter-refinery averaging of lead in gasoline); see also 135 CONG. REC.
H4450, H4451-52 (Daily ed. July 27, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Lent); Wicker, Bush's Acid
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there are good reasons to conclude that, carefully applied, such a sys-
tem could reduce some emission reduction costs. 2 But ultimately a
program based on marketable permits depends-as does command-
and-control regulation-on the EPA's ability to identify environmental
hazards prospectively, determine acceptable levels of pollution, and en-
force its decisions.73 Like command-and-control regulations, marketa-
ble permits do not force the private sector to shoulder the risk that the
level of regulation imposed by the government will be insufficient to
protect the public.
IV. THE NEw LIABILITY-BASED INCENTIVES TO AVOID POLLUTION
Current regulatory programs, however flawed, result from years of
legislative and administrative effort and comprise a system familiar to
the regulated community, environmentalists, lawyers and politicians.
And regardless of the shortcomings of command-and-control regula-
tion, the environmental statutes of the 1970s did lead to some im-
provements, albeit in limited areas.74 Nonetheless, even if the wisdom
of attempting a massive overhaul of current regulatory programs re-
mains unclear, by 1980 the need to supplement the system was
obvious.
75
In December 1980, during the final days of the Carter administra-
tion, Congress enacted the sweeping Superfund statute known as
"CERCLA. 176 Public attention surrounding CERCLA focused on crea-
tion of the multi-billion dollar Superfund to pay for government
cleanup of abandoned waste sites. But it is CERCLA's broad and ret-
roactive liability provisions that fundamentally alter environmental
law, imposing new planning and cleanup obligations on all segments of
the economy.
Confounding those who considered CERCLA the last gasp of a lib-
eral, lame-duck Congress and President, Congress enacted-and Presi-
dent Reagan signed-HSWA in 19847 and SARA in 1986,78 increasing
Test, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at A19, col. 1 (President Bush proposed acid rain con-
trol program that depends, in part, on "market approach" to allocate emission
reductions.).
72. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 45, at 175-78.
73. See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uni-
form Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1301
nn.166 & 169 (1985).
74. Shabecoff, supra note 19.
75. See supra note 4.
76. For a legislative history of CERCLA, as enacted in 1980, see Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1982).
77, See supra note 8.
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the environmental liabilities of the business community still further.
The use of retroactive, liability-based statutes to encourage private in-
vestment in environmentally sound practices clearly is an idea whose
time has come.
A. The Creation of Strict, Joint and Several Liability
The liability-based statutes of the 1980s reflect a policy choice by
Congress that those in some way responsible for the release of toxic
chemicals, rather than the public at large, must bear the costs of envi-
ronmental pollution.79 Thus, Congress imposed strict, joint, several and
retroactive liability for toxic contamination on broad categories of par-
ties whom Congress deemed responsible for contaminated sites.80 Fur-
thermore, Congress authorized all citizens (in addition to the EPA, the
states, local governments and Indian tribes) to enforce important pro-
visions of the law."" By casting such a wide net of liability, and depu-
tizing so many potential enforcers, Congress imposed a burden on the
business community to anticipate, avoid and clean up environmental
contamination that knows only ill-defined limits.
Congress designed CERCLA primarily to address inactive hazard-
ous waste sites such as Love Canal-a problem that did not fall
squarely within the ambit of previous environmental laws. 2 Nonethe-
less, CERCLA applies to essentially any actual or threatened release of
a hazardous substance whether at an inactive or active site, regardless
of the applicability of other statutes.8 3 Under CERCLA, "responsible
parties" are liable for investigation, cleanup and litigation costs, and
natural resource damages. Such parties include current owners or oper-
78. See Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10360 (Dec. 1986).
79. See United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th
Cir. 1989); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985); Ohio ex rel. Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See generally Grad, supra note 76.
80. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989); see also infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
81. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp. V 1987); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987); see also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V
1987).
82. See United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (district
court holding, prior to HSWA, that RCRA applies to active conduct and not to leaching
from waste disposed of before RCRA became effective), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir.
1984). HSWA clarified that RCRA does apply retroactively to problems created before
its enactment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
83. See, e.g., Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D.
Colo. 1989); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 822 (D. Colo. 1985).
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ators of pollution sources and contaminated sites, those who owned or
operated such sites at the time of disposal of hazardous substances,
those who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous substances, and those
who transported the substances to disposal sites.
8 4
The federal government, the states, Indian tribes and "any other
person" may conduct CERCLA studies and cleanups (i.e., "removal"
and "remedial action") at contaminated sites and recover their costs
from responsible parties.8 5 In addition, the EPA may issue administra-
tive orders requiring responsible parties to conduct removal or reme-
dial action when "there may be an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to public health or welfare or the environment. 86 The United
States, the states, Indian tribes and, arguably, local governments may
recover damages for injuries to natural resources from those same
parties.
8 7
CERCLA cleanups must proceed in a manner "consistent" (or
"not inconsistent") with the EPA's National Contingency Plan
(NCP).s8 Before permanent cleanups ("remedial actions") are con-
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1987). CERCLA's imposition of liability on
those who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous substances encompasses generators
whose hazardous substances arrive at contaminated sites in a variety of ways. See e.g.,
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (D. Colo. 1989) (by allowing
hazardous substances to erode into river, defendants "arranged for" disposal of hazard-
ous substances at downstream site); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 720, 731 (D.R.I.
1988) (waste generator is liable for releases from disposal site even though generator
arranged for disposal of waste at different site and waste hauler took waste to site at
issue without generator's authorization), afl'd 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1115 (1990). See generally United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chems. Corp.,
872 F.2d 1373, 1378-82 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA's "arranged for" language).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A), (B), (D) (Supp. V 1987). The terms "removal" and
"remedial action" are defined at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23)-(25) (West Supp. 1989).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)(1982); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 191-97 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see infra note 97.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(C) (1982). See generally Ohio v. United States Dep't
of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (overturning U.S. Department of the Interior
regulations regarding the measure of natural resource damages under CERCLA); Cross,
Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 269 (1989); Kenison, Buchholz &
Mulligan, State Actions for Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement of the Public
Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10434 (1987); Landreth & Ward, Natural Re-
source Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10134 (1990). At least two courts have held that local governments
are included within CERCLA's definition of "states" and, thus, may recover natural re-
source damages. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 683-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J.
1985). But see City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D.Pa.
1989).
88. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) is codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.920.
The EPA revised the plan effective April 9, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (1990); see also 53
Fed. Reg. 51,394 (1988) (the proposed revisions). Cleanups conducted by the United
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ducted, the NCP requires an expensive array of studies for which re-
sponsible parties ultimately must foot the bill. The NCP mandates:
* Studies to identify the nature and extent of contamination at
polluted sites ("the remedial investigation");
" Studies to evaluate cleanup or mitigation alternatives ("the feasi-
bility study");
• Studies to evaluate the risks posed by the contamination ("the
risk assessment");
* Identification of standards to be applied to the cleanup ("appli-
cable or relevant and appropriate standards");
* Public education and participation; and
o Selection of a site-specific cleanup plan that complies with statu-
tory and regulatory criteria ("the remedial action plan")., 9
States, a state, an Indian tribe, and, arguably, a local government (see supra note 87)
must be "not inconsistent" with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
In other words, government-conducted cleanups are presumed consistent with the NCP
unless defendants in an enforcement action meet their burden of proving otherwise.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747-48 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). Private plaintiffs, however, must prove that
their response actions were "necessary" and "consistent" with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(1).(4)(B) (Supp. V 1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 263
n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
89. Federally-financed remedial action is governed by 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420-.435.
(The Code of Federal Regulations citations contained in this footnote are the to-be-codi-
fied sections as they are set forth in the EPA's revised National Contingency Plan, 55
Fed. Reg. 8813-65 (1990)). Such action may be taken by federal agencies and-pursuant
to EPA delegation-by states, Indian tribes or local governments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
9604(d)(1) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Subpart F (authorizing, inter alia, coop-
erative agreements and Superfund Memoranda of Agreement between EPA and other
government bodies). The requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420-.435 also serve as guid-
ance for actions by states, Indian tribes or local governments that are not federally
funded. Id. § 300.400(i)(2); see also id. § 300.515(e)(2)(ii) (EPA concurrence is not a
prerequisite to state actions that are not federally-financed). Remedial action by private
parties is governed by 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5)(vii)-(ix), (6), (7) & (8), which incorpo-
rates many of the standards of 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420-.435.
If a "remedial site evaluation" (including a "remedial preliminary assessment" and a
"remedial site inspection," 40 C.F.R. § 300.420), reveals the need for remedial action, the
NCP requires the responding government or person to perform "scoping" to ensure that
the response is appropriate to conditions at the contaminated site. Id. § 300.430(b). This
step includes: evaluation of existing data; identification of potential cleanup alternatives;
limited data collection (when appropriate); identification of the type, quality and quan-
tity of data to be collected in future studies; preparation of health and safety plans (in-
cluding an employee training plan); notification of appropriate natural resource trustees
(so that they may begin steps to recover natural resource damages); development of a
sampling and analysis plan (including a field sampling plan and a quality assurance
plan); and preliminary identification of cleanup standards. Id. § 300.430(b)(1)-(8).
Next, the NCP requires a "remedial investigation" to determine the nature and ex-
tent of the threat posed by releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances. Id. §
20
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In addition, the NCP specifies procedures for taking short-term
300.430(d)(1). The remedial investigation involves, as appropriate, data collection (in-
cluding sampling, monitoring and treatability studies), a risk assessment study, and
identification of applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs). Id. §
300.430(d)(1)-(4). "Applicable" requirements specifically address the circumstances
found at the site; "relevant and appropriate" requirements address problems sufficiently
similar to those encountered at the site that their use is well-suited to the site. Id. §
300.5.
The NCP requires the responding government or person to perform a "feasibility
study," more or less concurrently with the remedial investigation, to develop and evalu-
ate alternative cleanup goals and technologies. Id. § 300.430(e). The feasibility study
involves consideration of a broad range of options, including, as appropriate, recycling,
treating, removing and containing hazardous substances, limiting public access, and tak-
ing no action. Id. § 300.430(e)(2)-(3). The NCP requires screening of these alternatives
(as appropriate) to narrow the list of options and eliminate those that are ineffective,
impractical or unduly expensive. Id. § 300.430(e)(7)(i)-(iii). Alternatives may be elimi-
nated on the basis of cost when cheaper alternatives are available that are similarly ef-
fective and practical and that use similar technologies or when costs are grossly excessive
compared to the overall effectiveness of the cleanup. Id. § 300.430(e)(7)(iii).
After the screening, each remaining alternative that represents a "viable" cleanup
approach must be analyzed in detail, according to nine criteria for evaluation: (1) overall
protection of the public and environment; (2) compliance with ARARs; (3) long-term
effectiveness; (4) reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume through treatment; (5) short-
term effectiveness and impact; (6) implementability; (7) cost; (8) acceptability to the
affected state or Indian tribe; and (9) acceptability to the community. Id. § 300.430(e)(9).
Based on the remedial investigation/feasibility study, the NCP requires selection of
a cleanup plan according to these same nine evaluation criteria. Id. § 300.430(f). Criteria
1 and 2 are "threshold criteria" that, subject to limited exceptions, must be met by any
remedy. Id. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(A), (ii)(A)-(C). Criteria 3 through 7 are "primary balancing
criteria"-allowing for trade-offs between them. Id. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(B), (ii)(D)-(E). Fi-
nally, criteria 8 and 9 are "modifying criteria" which must be considered, but cannot
justify departure from threshold criteria. Id. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(C), (ii)(E).
The NCP requires the responding agency or person to present its proposed selection
of a cleanup plan to the public in conjunction with an ongoing community relations pro-
gram. Id. § 300.430(f)(2)-(3); see also id. § 300.430(c) (setting forth community relations
requirements). A final plan is selected after evaluation of public comment. Id. §
300.430(f)(4). The selected cleanup plan must (1) be protective of human health and the
environment; (2) meet ARARs (subject to narrow exceptions); (3) be "cost-effective,"
providing that threshold criteria are met; and (4) provide the best balance of primary
balancing criteria with an emphasis on long-term effectiveness and reduction of toxicity,
mobility or volume through treatment. Id. § 300.430(f)(1)(ii).
To determine cost-effectiveness, the responding agency or person must compare cost
with a balance of three of the five primary balancing criteria: long-term effectiveness;
reduction of toxicity, mobility or volume through treatment; and short-term effectiveness
and impact. Id. § 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(D). Under the NCP, an alternative is cost-effective if
costs are "proportional" to overall effectiveness. Id. The cost-effectiveness requirement
does not, however, require a cost-benefit study. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8726-30 (1990)
(EPA's explanation of its approach to cost); see also HousE CONFERENCE COMM. REP.,
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, H-R. CONF. REP. No. 962,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,
3338 (The term "cost-effective" means that the decision-maker "first determines the ap-
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actions ("removal actions") to protect the public and environment
from contamination pending selection, design and completion of per-
manent cleanups. 0
Without changing this basic scheme, SARA-the 1986 amend-
ments to CERCLA 91-increases the cost of cleanups by requiring that
remedial action provide "permanent solutions ... to the maximum ex-
tent practicable. 9 2 SARA also enhances the states' ability to influence
the EPA's remedy selection decisions, allows citizens to enforce stan-
dards that "have become effective" under CERCLA,9 3 and authorizes
states to obtain court-ordered cleanups.
94
Under SARA, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Regis-
try (ATSDR) must prepare toxicological profiles of hazardous sub-
stances. Also, SARA Title I created the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which requires businesses
to submit reports to public agencies about the nature, quantity and
location of dangerous chemicals that they use, store, dispose of and
release. 5 Information provided by EPCRA and ATSDR's toxicological
profiles may increase public pressure for additional government action
and also may prove useful to plaintiffs using the tort system to respond
to environmental risks.9"
HSWA amended RCRA in 1984 by, among other things, authoriz-
ing any person (including states, local governments and Indian tribes)
to bring suit against any transporter, generator, owner or operator who
contributes or contributed to handling or disposal of any solid or haz-
ardous waste that "may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment.91 7 This provision creates a fed-
propriate level of environmental and health protection to be achieved and then selects a
cost-efficient means of achieving that goal.").
Selection of the cleanup plan is followed by documentation and design and by oper-
ation and maintenance. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430(0(5), (6), .435.
90. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8842-44, 8858 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.410-
415, .700(c)(5)(v)-(vi), (6), (8)).
91. See supra notes 10 & 78.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (Supp. V 1987).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0 (Supp. V 1987) (state participation); id. § 9659 (citizen
enforcement).
94. Id. § 9621(e)(2); Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (D.
Colo. 1989); see Babich & Hanson, State Enforcement of CERCLA: The Idarado Deci-
sion in Perspective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 735 (1989). But see United States v. Akzo
Coatings of Am., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 571, 577-78 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. V 1987) (ATSDR); id. §§ 11001-11050 (EPCRA).
96. See Sherwood & Fitzsimmons, The ATSDR: A Plaintiff's Dream Come True?, 2
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1072 (Mar. 2, 1988).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987). The courts have interpreted the
phrase "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment" to refer to a signifi-
cant risk of eventual environmental harm. An "endangerment" (i.e., threat) is "immi-
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eral cause of action, as well as broad, strict, joint, several and
retroactive liability, for public nuisances that pose a significant risk of
eventual harm to the public or environment."
HSWA also added provisions to RCRA to protect the public from
leaking underground storage tanks, 9 mandate that the EPA and the
states force parties regulated under RCRA to clean up past contamina-
tion,100 and, generally increase the stringency, expense and complexity
of RCRA compliance.' 0 '
In short, Congress's environmental initiatives of the 1980s impose
strict, joint, several and retroactive liability for cleanup and for expen-
sive federally-mandated studies on essentially every party who ever
had significant involvement with hazardous waste or contaminated
property.
B. Creating Incentives to Clean Up
Strict, joint and several liability directly threatens the profits of
the countless businesses involved-directly or indirectly-with pollut-
ing activities, including businesses that acquire real estate polluted by
nent" even if the harm may not occur for many years. See United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 194 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Thus, the situation need not present
an emergency for RCRA to apply. See United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 165
(4th Cir. 1984); cf. United States v. Midway Heights County Water Dist., 695 F. Supp.
1072, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (holding, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, that the court
need not wait until actual harm occurs before acting under the "may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment" standard).
Moreover, actions under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) are not limited by the EPA's
regulatory definition of RCRA Subtitle C "hazardous waste". Instead, such actions may
be based upon the broad, statutory definitions of "hazardous" and "solid" waste. Cf. 40
C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(2) (1989) (the regulatory definition does not limit EPA's authority to
respond to potential imminent and substantial endangerments).
98. Middlesex County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp.
715, 722 (D.N.J. 1986) (Congress intended to codify public nuisance remedies). Persons
who contribute or contributed to "the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal" of solid or hazardous waste are strictly liable for any result-
ing endangerment. Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 835 (D. Vt. 1988); cf. United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 740 (8th Cir. 1986)
(Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) to impose liability without fault or negligence),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) authorizes courts
to impose joint and several liability. Cf. United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chems.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382-84 (8th Cir. 1989); Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at
199 (construing the substantially identical language of 42 U.S.C. § 6973).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (Supp. V 1987).
100. Id. § 6924(u)-(v).
101. See, e.g., id. § 6924(c)-(k). See generally R. FORTUNA & D. LENNETr, HAZARDOUS
WAsTE REGULATIN-THE NEw ERA (1987).
1990]
23
Babich: Understanding the New Era in Environmental Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
others.10 2 Under strict liability statutes, responsible parties are liable
for environmental contamination regardless of individual degrees of
102. See generally ABA Standing Committee on the Environment, Burdens of En-
vironmental Regulation on Private Property Ownership and Business Transactions:
Reasonable or Unreasonable? 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10348 (Sept. 1988); Ev-
ans, Environmental Audits of Real Property, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 20 (1988);
Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73 A.BA J. 66
(Nov. 1, 1987); McNerney, McInnis & Towe, Tilting at Windmills: Trying to be an In-
nocent Purchaser, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 135 (July 5, 1989); Leifer, EPA's Innocent
Landowner Policy: A Practical Approach to Liability Under Superfund, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 646 (August 4, 1989).
Generally, the courts have read CERCLA's imposition of liability on "owners" and
"operators" of contaminated property very broadly. See, e.g.. Colorado v. Idarado Min-
ing Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20578 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (D. Colo. 1987) (parent corporation and
subsidiary are liable as "owners" and "operators" of site owned by another subsidiary);
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lender
that took title to contaminated property at foreclosure sale is liable for cleanup costs.);
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(lender who foreclosed on borrower's property may be liable for cleanup).
An owner or operator is not liable if he or she can prove that the act or omission of a
third party (other than an employee or agent or one whose act occurs in connection with
a "contractual relationship" with the defendant) was the sole cause of the contamination
and that (1) the defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances
at issue, and (2) the defendant took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
third parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). As used in section 9607(b), the term "con-
tractual relationship" includes contracts for sale or transfer of real property unless (1)
the defendant acquired the property after contamination and (2) the defendant proves
that he or she did not know and "had no reason to know" of the contamination, or the
defendant is a government that acquired the property by escheat, by other involuntary
transfer, or by eminent domain, or the defendant acquired the property by inheritance
or bequest. Id. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
To prove that he or she "had no reason to know" of the contamination, a defendant
must have undertaken "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to mini-
mize liability." Id. § 9601(35)(B). This "innocent landholder" exception to CERCLA lia-
bility is of uncertain scope, since the courts have yet to define "all appropriate inquiry."
See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989)
(under some circumstances, no inquiry may be sufficient). The exception does not apply
to an innocent landholder who contributes to the release of hazardous substances or,
after discovering the contamination, transfers the property to another without disclosure.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C)-(D). See generally Superfund Program: De Minimus Landowner
Settlements and Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989).
Another exception to CERCLA liability, codified as an exception to the definition of
"owner or operator," applies to a lender who "without participating in the management
of a ... facility holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the . . . facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987). A facility is "any site . ..
where a hazardous substance has . . . come to be located." Id. § 9601(9). See generally
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that a
secured party was not an "owner or operator" under CERCLA).
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fault.103 In other words, it is unnecessary to prove that a responsible
party negligently or intentionally caused contamination in order to
force cleanup and recover costs and damages.
The doctrine of joint and several liability holds each responsible
party at a contaminated site individually liable for the entire cleanup
and the entire amount of damages.104 Joint and several liability simpli-
fies enforcement by making proof of each responsible party's specific
contribution to the problem unnecessary. In many cases in which there
are several responsible parties, such proof would be impossible, since
chemicals in the environment rarely can be "fingerprinted" (i.e., traced
back to their original owners). 05 Congress provided liable parties with
legal recourse against one another for contribution, to ensure that each
pays its fair share of cleanup costs and damages.'06
When liability for pollution threatens profits, businesses invest in
reducing that threat until they judge it to be outweighed by the cost of
taking further precautions. 07 Of course, in the, short run, much of that
investment consists of paying lawyers to find loopholes in the law and
lobbyists to seek legislative changes. As it becomes clear, however, that
Congress and the courts will not weaken the laws, the focus inevitably
shifts to investment in more environmentally beneficial projects, such
as early identification and management of pollution problems and min-
103. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987). The standard
of liability under CERCLA is "the standard of liability which obtains under [the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §] 1321." 42 US.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, undoubtedly imposes strict liability. See, e.g., United States
v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 625 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 994
(1981); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1309 (7th Cir. 1978).
Thus, CERCLA also provides for strict liability. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 16 Envtl. L. Rep
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,561 (D. Colo. 1985) (Carrigan, J.); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Re-
cycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 991 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in
part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.
Ohio 1983); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
104. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1115 (1990); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-61 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
105. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (Supp. V 1987); see also Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (RCRA compliance costs
may be recovered from other responsible parties under CERCLA). Colorado v. Asarco,
Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985) (right to contribution is available under CERCLA
as matter of federal common law).
107. See Dechert & Smith, Environmental Liability and Economic Incentives for
Hazardous Waste Management, 25 Hous. L. REv. 935 (1988); Frost, Strict Liability as
an Incentive for Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 Hous. L. Rav. 951 (1988).
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imization of toxic waste.108
C. Thy Brothers' (and Sisters') Keeper
Because the new environmental laws impose liability regardless of
fault, potentially responsible parties must police not only their own
conduct but also that of their peers. For example, a landowner-or a
lender with an interest in property-may be liable for pollution that a
tenant, borrower or even a prior owner has caused.109 Thus, an increas-
ing number of landowners, lenders, real estate investors and others
with interests in property now insist on environmental audits to iden-
tify pollution problems before completing business transactions.'
Similarly, because waste generators no longer may avoid liability by
paying a waste hauler to take responsibility for disposal, generators
have a powerful incentive to ensure that hazardous waste is handled
properly by all involved.""
Liability-based laws empower parties facing potential liability due
to contamination caused in whole or in part by others to bring private
actions for cleanup and to recover their investigation, litigation and
cleanup costs." 2 These private enforcement actions allow responsible
parties to avoid liability to the EPA and the public by cleaning up
problems at the expense of other, more culpable parties. Thus, strict,
joint and several liability provisions inspire far more cleanups than
could be achieved by the government acting alone.
D. Past Pollution, Future Liability
It is a commonplace that what the business community seeks most
from government regulators is consistency and certainty. Yet just as
the uncertainties of the market economy force industry to be creative
and flexible in production activities, increasing the uncertainty of envi-
ronmental liability can motivate businesses to approach environmental
108. See Hays, Chemical Firms Press Campaigns to Dispel Their "Bad Guy" Im-
age, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, The Right Re-
sponse, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, at F3, col. 1.
109. See supra note 102.
110. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 102. See generally Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement, 51 Fed, Reg. 25,004 (1986).
111. See 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987); see supra note 84.
112. E.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, (1st
Cir. 1989); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F.
Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World In-
dus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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issues with more care, creativity and flexibility. With its environmental
legislation of the 1980s, Congress shattered industry's expectations of
consistency by demonstrating a willingness to impose retroactive liabil-
ity for pollution that was legal when caused.11
Following enactment of CERCLA, businesses are on notice that
they can no longer rely on current EPA or Congressional deci-
sions-whether based on risk assessments, cost or politics-to shield
them from liability in the future.1 14 To avoid future liability, all poten-
tial polluters must conduct independent assessments to anticipate and
avoid the dangers their activities might otherwise create. Even indus-
tries that have convinced Congress to exempt them from requirements
of today's regulatory and liability statutes (for example, the oil and gas
industry) would be well-advised to minimize the damage they cause.
Their exemptions may not last forever.115
Investors in property contaminated with substances not currently
subject to CERCLA should carefully consider whether cleanup actions
taken today can reduce the threat of liability for expensive EPA-di-
rected cleanups in the future. By raising the spectre of retroactive lia-
bility, Congress has offered the business community compelling reasons
to identify environmental problems as early as possible and to plan
carefully to reduce risks.
E. The Role of Bureaucratic Waste
In an ironic twist, presumably unanticipated by Congress, the lia-
bility-based environmental statutes of the 1980s use the inherent inef-
ficiency of the federal bureaucracy to motivate private businesses to
conduct their own cleanups. Once a contaminated site comes to the
EPA's attention and is placed on the National Priorities List,"1" the
Agency generally will spend millions of dollars on studies, reports and
community relations activities long before any actual cleanup takes
113. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
732-37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co.,
605 F. Supp 1064, 1068-79 (D. Colo. 1985).
114. Indeed, CERCLA settlements generally contain reopeners so that defendants
are not released from liability if additional problems develop at the site. See 42 U.S.C. §
9622(f)(6) (Supp. V 1987).
115. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (waste that is
exempt from the definition of "hazardous waste" of RCRA Subtitle C nonetheless may
be a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA).
116. The National Priorities List is an EPA-determined list of sites that present
enough significant hazards to require federal action under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §
9605(a)(8)(B) (Supp. V 1987). The list is neither complete nor exclusive. See U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: ExTENT OF NATION'S POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE
PROBLEM STILL UNKNOWN, (GAO/RCED-88-44) (Dec. 1987).
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place. 11 7 When cleanup begins, it is unlikely to proceed in what mem-
bers of the private sector would recognize as a cost-effective or efficient
manner.118 Thus, in assessing potential environmental liabilities, busi-
nesses must consider not only the potential for legitimate cleanup costs
and natural resource damages, but also the probability that the EPA
will waste a great deal of money that it will expect to recover from
responsible parties.
The prospect of bureaucratic waste encourages responsible parties
to organize and take responsibility for site investigations and clean-
ups." If the EPA already has decided to address problems at the site
under CERCLA, the Agency will require an expensive panoply of stud-
ies, no matter who performs them. But responsible parties can reduce
costs by doing the studies themselves and in many cases can influence
ultimate cleanup decisions. 1 0 Moreover, because strict compliance with
the NCP is necessary only if the cleanup is directed or authorized by
the EPA-or by another party who wishes to preserve the right to re-
cover cleanup costs under CERCLA1 21-responsible parties who
achieve a cleanup before a site receives the EPA's attention may save
millions of dollars.
For these reasons, the relatively few-but highly publicized and
alarmingly expensive-cleanups that the EPA actually has conducted
have made a strong and constructive impression on the business com-
munity. In terms of inspiring private efforts to identify and clean up
pollution problems and reduce waste generation, the EPA's inefficient
Superfund program provides a great deal of bang for the buck.
F. Enhancing the Regulatory System
To reconcile its new, liability-based approach with existing regula-
tory programs, Congress carved an exception to liability under CER-
CLA for "federally permitted releases" of hazardous substances.12 2
117. See supra note 89.
118. See, e.g., Lee, EPA Response Action: Contracting and Cost Recovery Under
CERCLA, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 216, 219 n.41 (1989) ("the government may spend
from 100 percent to 500 percent more than a private client would spend to accomplish
essentially the same site study or cleanup").
119. See, e.g., INFORMATION NETWORK FOR SUPERFUND SETrLEMENTs, PRP ORGANIZA-
T'ON HANDBOOK (1989).
120. See EPA, A MANAGEMENT REVIEW Or THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM 2-19 to -21
(1989) (discussing EPA oversight of cleanups conducted by potentially responsible
parties).
121. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8835 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.185(d)).
122. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 96070), 9601(10) (Supp. V 1987). An analogous provision pre-
cludes recovery of natural resource damages for an environmental injury that was "spe-
cifically identified as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural resources in
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Under this exception, responsible parties are not liable for contamina-
tion authorized by permits issued under federal, and some state, envi-
ronmental laws. The provision encourages polluters to obtain and com-
ply with permits, enhancing the effectiveness of the regulatory system.
It also provides an incentive for those who discharge currently unregu-
lated substances to encourage government regulation and provide in-
formation to aid the government in setting reasonable standards.
Nonetheless, the "federally permitted release" exception to CER-
CLA liability could work better. Currently, a permit based on inade-
quate or even false information could, arguably, insulate a polluter
from liability. If the exception applied only to pollution for which the
government had issued a permit after considering all potential environ-
mental harm, it would encourage dischargers to provide complete, ac-
curate, and detailed information to regulators during the permitting
process.
G. Continuing the Restructuring
Because current liability-based statutes hold responsible parties li-
able for cleanup costs and damage to natural resources, but not for
damage to the health of individuals, the laws create an incentive for
reducing some risks of environmental contamination but not others.
For example, pollution of ground water or soils with heavy metals is
discouraged, since such pollution is long-lasting and expensive to clean
up. No similar deterrent exists, however, to pollution of air with toxic
chemicals, which, although dangerous, disperse in the atmosphere and,
thus, often do not require expensive cleanup. 123 If polluters faced a re-
alistic threat of liability for creating risks to public health, they would
devote their efforts to reducing a greater variety of pollution problems.
The common law tort system, which governs most injuries to indi-
viduals, is not well-suited to problems of toxic pollution and, thus, fails
to provide a credible threat of liability in many situations. In fact, the
common law of many jurisdictions does not even recognize some of the
injuries caused by exposure to toxic waste-such as increased risk of
cancer or birth defects.124
an environmental impact statement" or comparable analysis. Id. § 9607(f)(1). See gener-
ally Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(1)).
123. See Number of Air Pollution-Related Deaths in U.S., Canada, May be 50,000
Annually, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2629 (1989); Shabecroff, Industrial Pollution Called
Startling, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1989, at D21, col. 4; Shabecroff, U.S. Calls Poisoning of
Air Far Worse than Expected and Threat to Public, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1989, at
Bl, col. 1.
124. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). See
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By the time a victim of toxic contamination actually develops can-
cer or has a child with a birth defect, years or even decades may have
passed, making recovery of damages difficult. Often it is scientifically
impossible to establish conclusively that a cancer or birth defect was
caused by a particular chemical or pollution incident.12 5 Thus, to pro-
vide an effective deterrent to polluters, victims' legal remedies for toxic
contamination must be expanded and the burden of proof simplified.
One solution would be for Congress to create a legal remedy for
those who suffer increased risks of cancer, birth defects or other inju-
ries due to exposure to toxic chemicals.126 The pollution victim's bur-
den of proof could be set at a level that people who suffer such in-
creased risks can practically achieve. Once a person who has been
exposed to a dangerous pollutant makes a showing of an increased risk
of harm, it would be the polluter's burden to show that the jury should
not award damages. The polluter is in the best position to monitor and
analyze his or her waste to rebut potential victims' claims of increased
risk and to reduce exposures in the first place. By making polluters
liable for risks to public health, and adjusting the requirements of
proof appropriately, Congress can encourage polluters to study and
control the risks that their activities create.
V. CONCLUSION
Some industry representatives contend that the strict, joint and
several liability provisions of modern environmental laws are unfair
and should be abolished. 1 7 Current liability-based statutes, however,
embody a basic principle of American jurisprudence-long part of the
common law tort system-that liability for harm should be assigned to
those in the best position to prevent the harm from occurring. 28 Be-
generally Gluckstern, In Support of a Uniform National Discovery Statute, 4 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 551 (1989).
125. See Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Whitehead & Es-
pel, Legal Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1040
(1988).
126. See Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985).
127. See, e.g., Address by D.C. Thomas, Pollution Liability: The Tort System's
Ticking Time Bomb (Feb. 16, 1988) (available in Oct. 1988 Inside Superfund Conference
program).
128. Cf. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("Even if there is no negligence ... public policy de-
mands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively redupe the hazards to
life and health ... ."). See generally Special Committee on the Tort Liability System,
Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substan-
tive Justice in American Tort Law-Report to the American Bar Association 4-3 to -8
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cause problems of environmental pollution profoundly threaten the ec-
onomic well-being and quality of life in every segment of society, the
fairest solution is that which works best, most quickly, and least
expensively.
A more sophisticated attack on current liability-based cleanup
statutes is based on allegations that the EPA's Superfund program
works poorly, slowly and is extremely expensive. 29 Citing the few,
shockingly expensive cleanups obtained by the EPA and the tremen-
dous amount of resources spent on litigation rather than cleanup, some
businesses assert that a huge public works program to clean up existing
sites would be preferable. 30 This argument, however, ignores the in-
centives that current statutes-regardless of EPA inefficiency-provide
businesses to avoid creating pollution problems, clean up their own
messes, and plan carefully to avoid future retroactive liability for
chemicals that currently are not part of the federal statutory and regu-
latory scheme.'
3 '
Another argument for retreat from the environmental initiatives of
the 1980s is grounded in an attack on EPA and congressional priori-
ties. There is evidence-based on admittedly soft risk assessment
data-that hazardous waste sites pose less of a day-to-day threat than
other environmental problems, such as air pollution and pesticide con-
tamination of food.132 Arguably, if liability-based statutes divert soci-
(1984).
129. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING UP? 10 SUPERFUND
CASE STUDIES: A SPECIAL REPORT OF OTA's ASSESSMENT ON SUPERFUND IMPLEMENTATION
(June 1988); SURVEY AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF, A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON APPRO-
PRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE STATUS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY'S SUPERFUND PROGRAM (Mar. 1988).
130. Greenberg, Opinion, 18 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. 192 (1989) (setting forth an
insurance industry proposal for a public works program).
131. See EPA, supra note 120, at 4. The EPA states the following in partial answer
to critics of its Superfund program:
When all is said and done, few realize that the environmental benefits of
Superfund go well beyond Superfund cleanups. Since the passage of CERCLA,
many States have enacted their own hazardous waste site cleanup laws. The
Superfund liability standard has also provided a powerful incentive for busi-
nesses, Federal facilities, and local governments to properly manage their
wastes. Additionally, the threat of potential Superfund liability has spurred
businesses, particularly during property transfers, to conduct environmental
audits and remediate environmental problems, not only for hazardous wastes
but for environmental problems in general.
Id.
132. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A CoMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROBLEMS-OVERVIEW REPORT (Feb. 1987). The EPA concluded that its rankings of
environmental problems by risk do not correspond closely with the EPA's program pri-
orities. See id. at xv. The EPA believes that criteria air pollutants, ozone depletion, and
pesticide residues on food generally pose higher risks than active and inactive hazardous
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ety's resources from more pressing problems to hazardous waste
problems that can wait, Congress should revise the statutes. Nonethe-
less, until memories of environmental disasters and near misses involv-
ing hazardous substances fade, efforts to place hazardous waste
problems on the back burner probably are doomed to failure. 133 In-
stead, Congress should seek ways of expanding its liability-based ap-
proach to address other significant risks.
The use of liability-based statutes to supplement regulatory pro-
grams and encourage the private sector to focus its energy, competence
and creativity on protecting the environment is one of the most prom-
ising developments in the history of environmental law. Although the
business community cannot be expected to shoulder its new environ-
mental planning and cleanup responsibilities gladly, it is uniquely
qualified to do so competently and efficiently. Continued reliance on
strict, joint, several and retroactive liability is our surest means of
achieving real progress in environmental protection.
waste sites. See id. at 95. Overall, "EPA's priorities appear more closely aligned with
public opinion than with estimated risks." Id. at 96; see also Hanley, New Jersey Ques-
tions Superfund Priority, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at BI, col.2.
133. See supra note 39.
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